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1. Introduction 
The price of bitcoin increased from $250 in June of 2015 to more than $19,000 by December of 2017, 
where it commanded a market capitalization in excess of $325 billion before stabilizing around the 
$10,000 level. 1 Presently, Bitcoin sees many hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of transactions 
cross its system on a daily basis; and yet, the cryptocurrency functions entirely as its own 
decentralized computer network, without any central bank, government, or regulatory body to back 
it. This has led some to conclude that the price of the cryptocurrency is a massive speculative bubble, 
with some researchers claiming that there is no fundamental underpinning to its value (e.g. Hanley 
2013; Yermack 2013). Cheah and Fry (2015), among others, echo recent comments made by Jamie 
Dimon, the CEO of investment bank JPMorgan Chase, in asserting that the fundamental value of 
bitcoin is indeed zero, and that the entire pursuit is a fool’s errand, or worse a fraud.2 Even the Wall 
Street Journal has opined that Bitcoin is “probably worth zero.”3 Nonetheless, the popularity of the 
                                                 
1 For consistency, Bitcoin with a capital ‘B’ refers to the general system, network and protocol, while bitcoin with a 
small ‘b’ refers to the digital currency itself or units thereof 
2 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-12/jpmorgan-s-ceo-says-he-d-fire-traders-who-bet-on-fraud-
bitcoin 
3 https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoins-wild-ride-shows-the-truth-it-is-probably-worth-zero-1505760623 
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cryptocurrency continues to rise, and its price remains far from nil. Against this backdrop, it is of 
growing concern to evaluate the basis for value of bitcoin. 
 Challenging the views of Mr. Dimon and the grim hypotheses of some skeptical researchers, 
Hayes (2016) suggests that bitcoin does indeed have a quantifiable intrinsic value and formalizes a 
pricing model based on its marginal cost of production:4 “mining,” or the process of creating new 
bitcoins through concerted computational effort requires the consumption of electric power, which 
incurs a real monetary cost for mining participants, and thus the value of bitcoin is the embodied costs 
of production (on the margin).  
 This study seeks to test the validity of this cost of production theory of value by back-testing 
the pricing model against the observed market price, going back nearly five years. A simple OLS 
regression indicates that the model price explained approximately 81% of the observed market price 
and a striking 97% of the observed changes in market prices over that period. Following this up, a 
Granger test on the postestimation results of a subsequent vector autoregression (VAR) model is 
carried out, which strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the pricing model does not “cause” the 
market price. The Granger test is used here not assert causality, but to support the notion that the 
modeled price and the observed price match up to a statistically significant degree over time. 
2. The Cost of Production Model 
The process and technical elaboration of bitcoin production (“mining”) is described at length 
elsewhere (e.g. Kroll et al. 2013; Sapirshtein et al. 2016; Nakamoto 2008). Suffice it to say that 
mining involves a competition among producers; with a novel feature that the rate of new unit 
formation is fixed so that increased demand cannot induce a greater supply, and so this elasticity is 
                                                 
4 Or at least, an expected lower bound to its market price 
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manifest instead through increased difficulty in the production process itself, increasing the system-
wide marginal cost of production. 
 The primary ongoing cost for bitcoin production is that of electricity, measured in dollars per 
kilowatt-hour (kWh). Of course, different regions of the world will consume electricity at their local 
rates (which may vary by customer type, power generation source, and time of day) and in their local 
currencies, but for the sake of convenience it is a good working assumption that the average rate of 
electricity worldwide accounting for both residential and commercial rates is approximately USD 
$0.135 per kWh.5 
  Following Hayes (2016: ), The (marginal) cost of production per day, Eday per unit of mining 
power can be expressed as: 
                           ( )( )/1000 $ / /day dayE kWh WperGH s hrρ= ⋅ ⋅         (1) 
where: Eday is the dollar cost per day for a producer, ρ is the hashpower (computational power) 
employed by a miner, $/ kWh is the dollar price per kilowatt-hour, and W per GH/s is the energy 
efficiency of the hardware, and hrsday is the number of hours in a day.  
In order to calculate the expected number of bitcoins the same miner can produce daily, the 
following equation is used to calculate the daily (marginal) product: 
32
sec/ *
2
hr
dayBTC day hr
βρ
δ
⋅ =  ⋅                                           (2) 
where: BTC/day* is the expected level of daily bitcoin production when mining bitcoin, β is the block 
reward (expressed in units of BTC/block), ρ is the hashing power employed by a miner, and δ is the 
                                                 
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electricity_pricing 
5 
 
difficulty (expressed in units of GH/block) The constant sechr is the number of seconds in an hour, 
hrday the number of hours in a day. Presently, the block reward is 12.5 BTC per block.  
 According to microeconomic theory, under conditions of competition, the marginal product 
should equate with its marginal cost, which should also equal its selling price. Because of this 
theoretical equivalence, and since cost per day is expressed in terms of $/day and production in 
BTC/day, the $/BTC price level is revealed as the ratio of (cost/day) divided by (BTC/day). This 
objective price of production, P*, serves as a logical lower bound for the market price, below 
which a producer would operate at a marginal loss and presumably remove themselves from the 
network. P* is expressed in dollars per bitcoin, given the difficulty and cost of production: 
                                                       *
/ *
dayEP
BTC day
=            (3) 
3. Testing the Model Empirically  
I back-test the above model using historical observed price data and compare that to what the model 
would have predicted. Observed market price and difficulty data were collected using the website 
blockchain.info, a reliable and transparent source of Bitcoin market and protocol data, at the dates 
of difficulty changes in the network (approximately once every two weeks) to consistently measure 
market price given a particular value of mining difficulty, from June 29, 2013 through April 27, 
2018.  
 The model requires as an input the average energy efficiency of the mining network. This 
information was extracted from Bitcoin mining hardware manufacturer websites and checked 
against a dedicated wiki page that catalogues the efficiency of current mining hardware 
(https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Mining_hardware_comparison). This data was then collected for each 
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date of difficulty change, scraped from the web using the internet archive’s wayback machine 
(https://web.archive.org/web/20170215000000*/https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Mining_hardware_compar
ison). As stated above, for simplicity, I hold electricity costs constant at 13.5 cents per kilowatt-
hour. Table A1, which appears in the Appendix, describes these data points along with estimated 
model price for each difficulty change date.  
 3.1 Conventional Regression Analysis 
As a first pass, I compared the ratio of observed price to modeled price over time, from June 2013 
through April 2018. As Figure 1 shows, since June 2013, the market price has tended to fluctuate 
about the price estimated by the model. In the chart, a y-axis value of 1.00 indicates that the market 
price and model price are identical. Values above 1.00 indicate a premium in the market relative to 
the model and below 1.00 a relative discount. Over the long-run (~5 years), the average ratio is 1.05, 
σ = 0.33, which is striking in its accuracy. This suggests that the market for bitcoin has been quite 
efficient from a production standpoint, if not volatile, contradicting assertions that this market is 
consistently inefficient (e.g. Urquhart 2016). There is evidence of increased volatility from 
approximately September 2017 through January 2018, indicating that the market had deviated 
substantially from the model, but did eventually converge once again. This spike indicates the 
emergence and reconciliation of a price bubble; however, the presence of such bubbles does not 
indicate a zero value, only that prolonged departures from the modeled price can exist, but which 
ultimately resolve to the marginal cost of production. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Ratio of bitcoin price observed in the market to the expected price produced by the model 
using historical data (source: www.blockchain.info). 1.00 would indicate that the two prices are 
identical, anything over 1.00 indicates a premium in the market and below a discount. The average 
for the study period is 1.05, σ = 0.33, indicating that over the long-term, the market price seems to 
fluctuate around the modeled price with striking consistency.  
 
This initial result is suggestive, and so a more rigorous analysis was undertaken to test the 
“fit” of the pricing model against observed historical data. The valuation model output and observed 
prices appear in Figure 2, with what amounts to two time series for comparison. A conventional OLS 
regression was first carried out to obtain a proxy for model fit and to judge how much of the market 
price is described by the model; which produces R2 = 0.813, telling us that 81% of the observed 
market price can be explained by the marginal cost of production model over the sample period. Next, 
I conduct a second OLS regression on the log transformations of each time series, yielding an R2 = 
0.969, suggesting that nearly all of the marginal change in market price can be explained by the 
change in marginal cost. 
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Figure 1: Historical bitcoin market price vs. ex-post implied model price, June 2013-April 2018 
 
 
 3.2 VAR Granger Analysis 
Next, in order to compare these two time series directly to each other in a methodologically rigorous 
way, I estimate a multivariate vector autoregression (VAR) with two lags each on the log 
transformation of market price and implied model price.6 The purpose of the VAR is primarily to test 
the postestimation results using a Granger test (Geweke 1982). Typically used to suggest temporal 
causality, I instead use this test here to evaluate the post-hoc predictive power of the cost of 
production pricing model. The test considers two null hypotheses: 
                                                 
6 Testing for autocorrelation suggests that two is the appropriate number of lags. 
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 H01: The market price does not “cause” the model price; and 
   H02: The model price does not “cause” the market price. 
As Table 1 shows, H01 cannot be rejected, which is to be expected: the model is supposed to describe 
the market and not the other way around. H02 however, is strongly rejected, and the alternative 
hypothesis that the model price implies the market price is given a large degree of support (p < 0.001). 
This key finding lends credibility that the marginal cost of production of bitcoin describes its price 
and disputes those who claim that bitcoin is worthless. 
4. 
Discussion & Conclusion 
The marginal cost of production has been proposed as a model to value bitcoin (Hayes 2016). In this 
paper, the cost of production model was back-tested using historical data showing that the market 
price of bitcoin tends to fluctuate around the model price, and with the model price explaining the 
market price in a statistically significant manner.  
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 This finding is striking given the volume of recent media accounts and research projects that 
have supposed no fundamental value at all for bitcoin (e.g. Cheah and Fry 2015). Moreover, it 
suggests that attempts to find a causal link between the long-run price of bitcoin and various 
exogeneous factors may be misguided (e.g. Ciaian et al. 2016; Kristoufek 2015; Polasik et al. 2015), 
as well as attempts to value bitcoin as if it were a traditional financial asset (e.g. Cretarola et al. 2017). 
 These findings are also indicative that the bitcoin market is susceptible to price bubbles, as 
has been suspected. However, despite a significant deviation in price to the upside from the Fall of 
2017 through early 2018, the cost or production model has remained resilient as the market price did 
ultimately converge with the model. This novel pricing method leads us to expect that during periods 
of excess demand (e.g. a price bubble), either the market price will fall and/or the mining difficulty 
will increase to resolve the discrepancy. In the case of the late 2017 bubble just described, it does 
appear that both mechanisms were at play: the price fell and the mining difficulty rose simultaneously. 
Bubbles in the bitcoin market have been explored in-depth elsewhere (e.g. Garcia et al. 2014; Cheah 
and Fry 2015; Li et al. 2018; Hafner 2018). Cheung et al. (2015) as well as Su et al. (2018) use the 
Phillips-Shi-Yu (2013, 2015) method of bubble detection, confirming that multiple short-lived 
bubbles have characterized bitcoin prices, with four “explosive bubbles” since 2011 inclusive of the 
late-2017 period already described (see also: Corbet et al. 2017). The current study adds to this 
literature suggesting that while bubbles can – and indeed have – existed in the bitcoin market, the 
resolution of such a bubble will not be a collapse toward zero, but rather toward its marginal cost of 
production. Future analysis of bitcoin bubbles given this prediction can be explored further following 
the method elaborated by Pavlidis et al. (2017) since the recent introduction of bitcoin futures markets 
in December 2017. This type of analysis, however, will require a lengthier time series than what is 
presently available. 
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 It is important to note that the above analyses apply primarily to bitcoin and does not 
necessarily extend to other cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum or Litecoin; although a similar study 
may indeed support the cost of production thesis there as well. Still, with Bitcoin dominating the 
digital currency market, both in scale and scope, it is a worthwhile pursuit to understand why this 
unique asset has value. 
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